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This paper diagnoses the norms of minority representation in the political processes of
constituting the legislature and of lawmaking in a representative democracy, and analyzes South
Korea’s proportional representation system as currently in operation primarily under the Public
Official Election Act (as most recently revised by Law No. 10067, effective March 12, 2010), as it
pertains to the representation of women. Under the current state of representative democracy in
South Korea, democracy can be strengthened by pluralizing the modes and sites of representation,
which entails that democratic institutions and practices take measures to include under-
represented groups whose perspectives would likely be excluded or marginalized in political
process. The most effective mechanism to implement such mandate of presence and participatory
engagement of under-represented groups may function at the early phase of political process,
where the representative body is constituted and the core agenda for legislation and policymaking
are introduced, deliberated and determined. South Korea’s proportional representation system
aims to promote such goal, particularly as it pertains to the representation of women.
Proportional representation as it currently operates in South Korea provides more opportunity
for differentiated representation than does a system based on single-member, simple plurality
electoral districts. Statistics indicate that the proportional representation system has contributed
to enhance the presence of women at the legislature in South Korea both at national and local
levels. The next and more constitutionally challenging task is how to improve the system so that
the system itself and the system-induced increase in the presence of women at the legislature may
bring in sustainable changes in perception of the constituents towards minority perspective
representation in political process and, further, actual legislative and political activities in this
vein.
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I. Introduction
This paper diagnoses the norms and the mechanisms of minority
representation in the political processes of constituting the legislature and of
lawmaking in South Korea in its growingly pluralized context, and
particularly analyzes South Korea’s proportional representation system in this
vein, as currently in operation in South Korea primarily under the Public
Official Election Act (as most recently revised by Law No. 10067, effective
March 12, 2010). In the course of analyzing the subject of minority
representation in a deliberative democracy largely based upon majority rule,
this paper first looks into the theories of representation and of legislation in a
democracy. This paper then moves on to emphasize the significant
constitutional ramification of the representation of the perspectives of the
minority and the marginalized groups in the lawmaking body and its
lawmaking. Then this paper applies these normative understandings in
analyzing the current proportional representation system in South Korea in its
increasingly pluralistic context.
Democracy operates largely by majority rule. It is a necessary and
sufficient condition for any democracy, however, that the government is
obligated to guarantee the rights of all individuals including minorities. At the
same time, in a pluralistic democracy that pursues autonomy and political
equality under the law of constitution, no absolute standard may be
applicable to assess individual laws and policies, and the legitimacy of laws
and policies may justifiably be measured and determined increasingly by the
democratic legitimacy of the means and processes adopted to produce such
laws and policies. The design structuring a particular system of democracy
should therefore institutionally guarantee the democratic legitimacy of the
means and processes that precede the decision-making for the polity, and
such means and processes in turn will support the democratic legitimacy of
the polity’s decision-making applicable to all constituents. Under the current
state of representative democracy in South Korea, the most effective
mechanism to protect and enhance the rights of the minorities may function at
the early phase of political process, where the representative body is
constituted, and, subsequently, the core issues and agenda for legislation and
policymaking are introduced, deliberated and determined. Hence, the
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representation and the participatory engagement of the minorities in the
earliest possible stage of the legislative and policymaking process are of
particular significance. 
This paper first looks into the normative connection between democracy
and legitimacy, reviews the concept of representation from the perspective of
inclusive political and social communication, and then, in this regard,
analyzes the mechanism for minority presence and representation at the
lawmaking institutions and the systems for balancing minority and majority
perspectives in the lawmaking process in South Korea. Such institutions and
systems for minority perspective representation have broader and deeper
constitutional ramifications in today’s South Korea, as the norms and values
in its political, social and cultural domains are increasingly diversified and
pluralized.
II. Minority Representation in South Korea’s
Representative-Deliberative Democracy from the
Constitutional Law Perspective
1. Different Models of Democracy and the Theories of Representation
In contemporary political and constitutional theory, the basic assumption
is that democracy is the best political form for restraining those with power
from their inevitable temptations towards abuse of power. It is further
assumed that in principle, only in a democratic political system do all
members of a society have the opportunity to influence public policy or
decision-making to serve or protect their interests. The corollary belief is that
democratic process is the best means for promoting legitimacy.
As an effort to emphasize inclusion, political equality and accountability in
the political process primarily based on an account of the model of
deliberative democracy, this paper thus should first look into the normative
theoretical connection between democracy and legitimacy in the sense that
democratic processes serve as the means of discovering and agreeing upon
the most just policies under the conditions of inclusive political equality and
public reasonableness. In actual democracies, however, it is witnessed
ubiquitously that some people and groups have significantly greater ability to
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represent their own interests and to use democratic processes for their own
ends, while others are excluded or marginalized therefrom. Discussions for
public policy and lawmaking in South Korea do not occur under conditions
free of such distorting influence of unequal power and control over various
resources. This paper limits itself to argue that one means of breaking the
vicious circle that enables the powerful to use formally democratic processes
to preserve privilege is to widen democratic inclusion in decision-making
processes as a means of promoting more legitimate outcomes. Such effort is all
the more necessary in a growingly pluralistic society of today’s South Korea.
Two models of democracy stand central in contemporary political and
constitutional theory. As conventionally discussed, these are the aggregative
model of democracy and the deliberative model of democracy.1) These two
models share certain assumptions with respect to the basic framework of
democratic institutions. For example, democracy requires the rule of law,
voting is the means of making decisions or law for the polity as a whole when
consensus is not possible or too costly to achieve, and democratic process
requires freedom of expression.
Among the two, the aggregative model of democracy interprets
democracy as the model of aggregating the interests and preferences of the
constituents in choosing public officials, policies and law. The goal of
democratic decision-making is to decide what representatives, policies and
laws will best correspond to the most widely and strongly held preferences. A
well-functioning democracy allows for the expression and competition among
diverse and plural preferences, and has reliable and fair methods or processes
for aggregating them to produce an outcome. 
As such, the aggregative model describes democratic processes of policy
formation and lawmaking as follows. Individuals in the polity have varying
preferences as to what they want government institutions to do; they know
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1) This understanding of models of democracy corresponds to the understanding, at a more
foundational level, of the concept and nature of representation. The analysis and argument
made in Section II of this paper as to the concept and nature of representation are primarily
based upon readings over time of the following authorities: DIANA C. MUTZ, HEARING THE OTHER
SIDE: DELIBERATIVE VERSUS PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY (2006); ADAM PRZEWORSKI, SUSAN C. STOKES &
BERNARD MANIN, DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION (1999); BERNARD MANIN, THE
PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1997); and HANNA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION (1972).
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that other individuals also have preferences that may or may not match their
own. Democracy is an open and competitive process in which political parties
and candidates offer their platforms and attempt to satisfy the largest number
of the constituents’ preferences. Constituents with similar preferences often
organize interest groups in order to try to influence the actions of political
parties and elected lawmakers. Individuals, interest groups and public
officials may each behave strategically, adjusting the orientation of their
choices according to their perceptions of the activities of competing
preferences. Assuming that the process of competition, strategizing, coalition-
building and responding to choices of the others is open and fair, the outcome
of both elections and legislative decisions reflects the aggregation of the
strongest or most widely held preferences in the population, which in turn
explains the democratic legitimacy of such decisions.
In particular, the preference aggregation model of democracy bears certain
shortcomings, on a normative stance that democratic process should be
connected to an interest of legitimacy. First, as each individual’s preferences
are taken as given, the aggregative model offers no criteria for distinguishing
preferences by substance or motive. Because preferences are conceived as
exogenous to the political process, there can be no account of how individuals’
political preferences may change as a result of interacting with others or
participating in the political process. Constituents never need to alter their
own interests and preferences for or as the result of interacting with others
whose preferences differ. This model thus lacks a distinct idea of a public or
the public good for the community as perceived by the constituents, formed
from the interaction of democratic citizens and their motivation to reach some
decision, and there is therefore no account of the possibility of political
coordination or cooperation.
Furthermore, the aggregative model is skeptical about the possibility of
normative and evaluative objectivity or rationality, as the aggregate outcome
has no necessary rationality and has not been derived by a process of
reasoning or deliberation. Even when certain individuals use the concept and
the language of morality, they are simply expressing and conveying a
particular kind of preference or interest which is no more rational or objective
than any other. The aggregative model of democracy offers no basis or means
to normatively evaluate the legitimacy of the substance of decisions. This
model thus offers a weak motivational basis for accepting the outcomes of a
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democratic process as legitimate for those who do not share the preferences
held by the most number of the constituents, except when they may feel that
they have no choice but to submit given that they are in the minority in
number or political power.
On the other hand, in the deliberative model, democracy is a form of
reason and deliberation. The basic frame under this model is that participants
in the democratic process offer proposals for how best to solve problems or
meet legitimate needs for the community, and they present arguments
through which they aim to persuade others to accept their proposals.
Participants arrive at a decision not by determining what preferences have
greatest numerical support, but by determining which proposals the collective
agrees are supported by the best reasons as expressed and deliberated. A
number of theories of deliberative democracy have appeared and developed
in recent years, renewing interests in reasoning, persuasion, acceptance,
inclusion, accountability, publicity, and normative appeals in democratic
politics.2)
First, on this model, a democratic decision is normatively legitimate only if
all those affected by it are included in the process of discussion and
decisionmaking. Second, as a normative ideal, democracy means political
equality. Not only should all those affected by a certain decision be nominally
included in decision-making, but they should be included on equal terms. All
should have an equal right and effective opportunity to express their interests
and concerns, and the ideal model of deliberative democracy hence promotes
free and equal opportunity to speak. Third, however, this can be maintained
only when participants have a disposition to be reasonable. Reasonable
individuals discuss to solve collective problems with the aim of reaching
agreement. It is true that often they will not reach agreement and they need to
have procedures for reaching decisions. However, reasonable individuals
understand that dissent tends to produce deeper and wider insight, and that
decisions and agreements should in principle be open to new challenge.
Therefore, participants in discussion intend to reach agreement through
deliberation when entering the discussion, though actually reaching
consensus is thus not a requirement of deliberative reasoning.
306 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 9: 301
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The conditions of such inclusion, equality and reasonableness entail that
the interaction among participants in a democratic decision-making process
forms a public in which individuals hold one another accountable.3) A public
consists of a plurality of different individual and collective experiences,
interests, opinions and perspectives that face one another to discuss collective
problems under a common set of procedures. When members of such a public
speak to one another, they know that they are responsible for that plurality of
others. This plural public-speaking context requires participants to express
themselves in ways accountable to all those plural others. Here, the content of
an expression does not have to be immediately understood or accepted by all
to be public, but, rather, the expression only should aim in its form and
substance to be understandable and acceptable.
This latter deliberative model responds primarily to democracy’s purpose
as a protection against tyranny and the ability of individuals and groups to
promote and protect their interests in politics and policy. Also, as crucial to the
main argument in this paper, the interactive aspect of this model accounts for
its greater comprehensiveness. In the deliberative model, political actors not
only express preferences and interests, but they engage with one another
about how to balance these under circumstances of inclusive equality. Because
this interaction requires participants to be open and attentive to other
participants, to justify their claims and proposals in terms acceptable to all, the
orientation of participants moves towards what is publicly assertable. Interests
and preferences continue to have a place in the processes of deliberative
democracy, but not as given and exogenous to the process. Most proponents
of deliberative democracy emphasize that this model conceptualizes the
process of democratic discussion as not merely expressing and registering, but
as transforming the preferences, interests, beliefs and perspectives of
participants. Through the process of public discussion with a plurality of
differently opinioned and situated others, individuals often gain new
information, learn of different perspectives and experiences of their collective
problems, or find that their own initial opinions are founded on lack of
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DEMOCRACY? (2004); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DESAGREEMENT (1998).
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information or on prejudice.
The analyses and discussions in the following part of this paper are based
upon the basic outlines of the model of deliberative democracy as indicated
above. Although this model also needs further refinement in order to serve a
theory of inclusive democratic process, it enables us to think of democracy
from the perspective of legitimacy of politics of inclusion.
2. Majority Rule, Minority, Participation and Representation under
South Korea’s Representative-Deliberative Democracy
Democracy operates primarily under majority rule. In a liberal democracy,
majority rule justifies decision-making of and for the polity among equal
individuals, operating as a method of decision-making and institutional
mechanism for maintaining and developing the community. In turn,
however, majority rule may be justified in a liberal democracy to the extent
that minority interests, opinions and perspectives are respected and
deliberated in decision-making processes and that minorities may become
majority upon persuading the majority. 
Under the very fundamental premise of liberal democracy of inalienable
human rights, all individuals including minorities are entitled to be respected
and to pursue happiness, and, in the contemporary constitutional democracy
including South Korea’s, the Constitution guarantees the fundamental rights
and certain core elements of constitutional institutions for all constituents to
whom the Constitution applies and not merely for those constituting majority
under particular criteria. Liberal democracy is thus defined as ruling by
majority through majority’s persuasion of minorities.4) Under this definition, a
liberal democracy should recognize, respect and pursue diversity among
308 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 9: 301
4) Kyong Whan Ahn,  Law and Legal Reasoning for Minority Protection, 2 LAW & SOC’Y 114,
115-118 (1990). Joon-Il Lee maintains that implementation of democracy is possible only when
the opportunity is open and available to the minority to be part of majority. Joon-Il Lee, Minority
and the Principle of Equality, 8(4) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 219, 223 (2002). In Sup Han reasons that, for
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of minorities is equivocal to retraining upon all their sovereignty. In Sup Han, Why Human
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Foundation ed., 2000).
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different yet equal individuals on the basis of human dignity and autonomy,5)
and should protect itself from coercive imposition of unjustified decisions
made by majority upon minorities.
Notwithstanding such normative importance ubiquitous to discussions in
the law and the practice of constitution, the concept of minority has been
employed in South Korea both in academic and other various contexts with
only a very loose, rather than any clear, definition.6) Conspicuous is Professor
Kyong Whan Ahn’s definition of the minority as “those standing in a different
position from the position considered to be dominant due to the causes of
ethnicity, gender, economic capability, ideology, morality and others, in
various political, social, economic, cultural and other domains within a
polity.”7) From such definition, some of the core elements of minority as
constitutional law concepts as applicable to the discussions in the following
part of this paper are derived as follows. 
First, minorities are individuals situated outside of or in the periphery of
the core position of power in relation to the majority, while belonging to the
polity. Second, the numerical size of such minority groups do not alter their
nature as minority, as women as a group in South Korea, though numerically
more than men, are minorities from the perspective of constitutional law for
their position outside of current core political, social and economic power
structure in South Korea. Third, minorities as criteria that are meaningful in
constitutional law analysis and discussion are those understood in the
historical context of a particular political community, such as in the specific
historical context of South Korea, and not merely at a then-current point of
time. Fourth, the concept of minority is relative and fluid, as concurrent and
overlapping criteria may apply to constantly divide and consolidate individuals
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6) Encyclopædia Britannica defines the term “minority” as follows: a culturally, ethnically,
or racially distinct group that coexists with but is subordinate to a more dominant group. As the
term is used in the social sciences, this subordinancy is the chief defining characteristic of a
minority group. As such, minority status does not necessarily correlate to population. In some
cases one or more so-called minority groups may have a population many times the size of the
dominating group, as was the case in South Africa under apartheid (c. 1950-91).
7) Ahn, supra note 4; Kyong Whan Ahn, Rule of Law and Minority Protection, 12 LAW & SOC’Y
6, 9 (1995).
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within a polity upon various issues and subjects.
Decision-making of a political community may be made through diverse
processes and means. However, under the constitution that pursues
democracy based upon human dignity, liberty and equality, all individuals
are at least as a matter of principle entitled to participate in the process of
decision-making that will bind them and their community. As discussed in
the preceding part of this paper, representative democracy is based upon the
premise that it may implement free and equal access to and participation in
the political processes of all constituents. However, in the actual reality in
South Korea, the cost of participation in political process has risen, thereby
weakening such equal access and participation in the politics.
This situation has particularly been conspicuous in South Korea in recent
years, as the South Korean society has been rapidly pluralized,8) whereas the
relevant law and systems have not been sufficiently supportive of or
productive in expressing, discussing and deliberating in public domain
further diversifying perspectives held by its constituents. A currently low
voter turnout at public elections in South Korea, with more notable cases at
local elections,9) is an indicative example of the challenge the South Korean
representative democracy faces now. In the present-day South Korean
constitutional politics, the possibility of alternation between majority and
minority positions is growingly conceived to be possible only by and at public
elections due to the politically and institutionally rising cost of participating in
310 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 9: 301
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titled “Pluralistic Society and the Constitution”). An effort to analyze pluralism in South Korea
is ongoing in South Korea across different disciplines. An independent effort in this direction
can be seen at, for example, Jin-Wan Park, Equality and Diversity, 6(1) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 182
(2000).
9) The voting rate in the recent public elections in South Korea is falling in general. At the
presidential election, the voting rate was 80.7% of all who were entitled to vote in 1997, 70.8% in
2002, and 63.0% in 2007. At the general election to constitute the national legislature, i.e.,
National Assembly, the voting rate was 57.2% in 2000, 60.6% in 2004, and 46.15% in 2008. At the
local election to constitute local council and to elect the chief executive officer of the local
government, the voting rate was 52.7% in 1998, 48.9% in 2002, and 51.65% in 2006. Statistics and
other relevant information concerning the voting rate at South Korea’s various public elections
is available at National Election Commission of the Republic of Korea’s URL at www.nec.go.kr.
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political process, causing the constituents or the members of the community to
distance themselves from the representatives. Without appropriate institutional
efforts, this phenomenon is to be exacerbated as the South Korean society is
further pluralized.
Taking some of the examples of institutional designs under the South
Korean law in this regard, National Assembly, i.e., the national legislature, is
primarily constituted through simple plurality vote where one candidate is
elected per electoral district (Public Official Election Act, Article 21(2)),
although South Korea also has the proportional representation system under
which 1/5.5 members of the representatives at National Assembly are elected
from the lists prepared by the political parties due to the ratio of votes given to
the political parties (Public Official Election Act, Articles 47, 150(3), 189(1)-(3)
and 190). At the same time, the nation’s President is elected also through
simple plurality vote (Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Article 67), while
relatively much power and authority is concentrated on the office of the
President. These systems together make it easier for larger political parties to
increase their influence upon political decisionmaking processes and national
politics overall.10)
Substantive decline of representative democracy in South Korea bears
direct relevance to the issue of minorities, as the system of representative
democracy under the South Korean Constitution is justified and operates
under majority rule. A representative democracy may be justified only when
diverse interests, opinions and perspectives of the constituents are sufficiently
expressed and deliberated through representative decisionmaking. In South
Korea, while the political reality indicates such representative mechanism has
not been successful, the design of legal system itself is not only largely
incapable of overcoming such reality but also rather exacerbating the
phenomenon as will be discussed in further detail in the following part.
In order to justify the function of the representatives and the exercise of the
constitutional public authority in growingly pluralizing South Korean
society,11) more than anything else, the mechanisms of composing the
decisionmaking bodies and of decisionmaking processes should have
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procedural and substantive legitimacy under the applicable concepts of
representation and deliberative democracy so that such mechanisms may
persuade the constituents or the members of the community concerning the
result of decisionmaking through such mechanisms. This ultimately calls for
an institutional effort to harmonize law and society in a pluralized society.
Such effort should not aim for implementing unison decision throughout the
polity; instead, this effort should aim for guaranteeing diversity and plurality
stemming from human nature that pluralism recognizes as the fundamental
purpose and function of any polity. In any democracy, including South
Korea’s representative democracy, such effort should embrace as the
constitutional mandate the presence and participation of minorities in the
political process. The constitutional relevance of representative political
process and pluralism, as perceived in the current-day South Korea, lies here.
Strong democracy requires many occasions when citizens and their
representatives meet to discuss issues and experiences with each other.
Theorizing democracy as a process of communication to arrive at decisions,
however, has not yet sufficiently stated the need to conceptualize democracy
as de-centered and pluralized in complex mass societies. In a polity as such,
South Korea being one example, democratic communication consists in
overlapping and diverging discussions and decisions, dispersed across the
community and also over time. In the context of such complex and mass
politics, instances of exclusion invoke norms of representation. It is often
claimed that the political or social groups they find themselves in or with
which they claim affinity are not properly represented in public discussions
and decision-making bodies, including legislatures, boards, media coverage of
issues, and so on. Such claims recognize in turn that in a large polity with
many complex issues, formal and informal representatives mediate the
influence individuals have. For these reasons many recent calls for greater
political inclusion in democratic processes argue for measures that encourage
more representation of under-represented groups, especially when these
groups are minorities or subject to structural inequalities.12)
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Both the idea and practice of promoting specific representation of
minorities are controversial, however, and the arguments and the policies for
the special representation of minority or marginalized groups face many
objections. Such objections presume a commitment to attend to, rather than
submerge, political and social differences, within any of such minority or
marginalized groups as defined in whichever way. It should be noted here
that the unifying process required by group representation freezes flexible
and multifaceted relations into a unified identity, which can recreate
exclusions. However, calls for special institutions or mechanisms of
representation of minority or marginalized groups do not seem to be muted
by these critiques, because, in the context of practical affairs, many people
believe that such measures are the best way to gain voice for many unfairly or
wrongly excluded issues, analyses and positions. This paper, in the following
paragraphs of this section, aims to clarify the meaning of such group
representation, and to provide persuasive arguments for such differentiated
representative practices as an important enactment of inclusion from the
constitutional law perspective.
Doubts about such practices derive at least in part from misunderstandings
about the nature of representation. Much discourse about representation
implicitly assumes that the person who represents stands in some relation of
identity or substitution with the many that are represented, that the
representative is present for the represented in their absence. This paper
conceptualizes representation, against such an image of representation as
identification or substitution, as a differentiated relationship among actors in a
polity who are engaged in its political processes that extend over different
domains and also over time. Adding the dimensions of time and mediated
space involved in the process of representation decentralizes the concept.
Many objections to practices of the specific representation of structurally
disadvantaged groups derive from the assumption that groups do not have
one set of common interests or opinions. However, being similarly positioned
in the political and social field generates a political and social perspective the
inclusion of which in public discussion processes of group representation may
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facilitate.
There are certain anti-representation positions indeed that representation
alienates political will at the cost of genuine democratic self-government.
However, it is given that representation is necessary, as the current-day
political and social life connects the action of some people and institutions in
one place to consequences in many other places and institutions. As such,
features of time and interaction produce de facto representation. Under such
circumstances, political equality may best be served by institutions of formal
representation, because the rules concerning who is authorized to speak for
whom are public and there are some norms of accountability. Hence, under
normative ideals of communicative democracy, representative institutions do
not stand opposed to participation of the represented, but require such
participation in order to function well. Representation does not rely on the
logic of identity or the metaphysics of presence. Rather, in an ideal democratic
decision-making situation, the represented are co-present with their
representatives. 
Political representatives usually have a large constituency that is diverse in
its interests, backgrounds, experiences, beliefs, values and so on. Also, it is
most likely more difficult to imagine a shared will for the residents of a
metropolitan legislative district than for members of an ethnic group. If we
accept the argument that representation is necessary, but we also accept an
image of democratic decision-making as requiring a co-presence of the
represented as well as the representatives, and that representation is
legitimate only if in some way the representative is identical with the
constituency, then representation is necessary but impossible. However,
taking seriously the pluralized and decentralized nature of mass democracy
serves as an exit out of this paradox in that it entails discarding images that the
representatives should be present for the represented. Instead, it now becomes
possible to conceive democratic discussion and decision-making as mediated
through and dispersed across the polity and over time. Rather than a relation
of identity or substitution, the representation from the constitutional law
perspective should be thought of as a process involving a mediated relation of
the constituents to one another and to the representative.13) Representation
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systems sometimes fail to be sufficiently democratic not because the
representatives fail to stand for the will of the constituents, but because they
have lost connection with them. 
The major normative problem of representation now is the threat of
disconnection between the representative and the many she or he represents.
And the constitutional importance of minority representation as discussed in
this paper lies here. When representatives become too separated, constituents
lose the sense that they have influence over policymaking or lawmaking,
become disaffected, and withdraw their participation. Establishing and
maintaining legitimate and inclusive processes of representation thus calls up
responsibilities for both representatives and constituents. The constituents
should be willing and able to mobilize one another actively to participate in
processes of authorizing and holding to account the representatives. The
representatives should listen to these public discussions and diverse claims,
stay connected to the constituents, and be able to convey reasons for their
actions and decisions in terms that recollect their discussions. Such
mobilization, listening and connectedness can be either facilitated or impeded
by the design of representative institutions.
As such, representation and participation are not alternatives in an
inclusive democracy that South Korea pursues under its Constitution, but,
instead, require each. Institutions of representation help organize political
discussion and decisionmaking, introducing procedures and a reasonable
division of functions, and the representatives thus should respond to such
participatory process. As such, since the representative is necessarily different
from the constituents, a democracy is better or worse according to how well
those differentiated positions are connected. Democracy in this regard can be
strengthened by pluralizing the modes and sites of representation.
Systems of political representation cannot make individuals present in
their individuality, but should represent aspects of a person’s identity, beliefs,
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representatives are different from the constituents, but should also be connected to the
constituents. At the same time, constituents should also be connected to one another.
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activity or experience where she or he has affinity with others. Potentially
there are many such aspects or affinity groups, and some of the general modes
through which a person can be represented include those according to
interests, opinions and perspectives. A person may be represented in several
ways within each of these modes, and explication of what it means to
represent perspective particularly provides arguments for the special
representation of disadvantaged or underrepresented social groups while
avoiding the problem of attributing to all members of those groups common
interests or opinions. Although individuals belonging to a broadly defined
social group may and do have varied interests and opinions since individuals
are multiply positioned in complexly structured societies, individuals
interpret the society from a multiplicity of social group perspectives. Though
interests, opinions and perspectives do not exhaust the ways people can be
represented, these are salient in the way we discuss representation in
contemporary politics, and in answering the conceptual and practical
problems posed for group representation to be discussed in the following
section of this paper.
3. Representation of Minority and Marginalized Groups in Legislature
and Political Process under Representative-Deliberative Democracy in
Light of Democratic Legitimacy
It is hardly deniable in contemporary politics in many democracies
including South Korea’s that members of less privileged structural social
groups are underrepresented.14) Structural social and economic inequality
often produces political inequality and relative exclusion from influential
political discussions on policymaking and lawmaking. In most political
systems including the one in South Korea, women occupy a small proportion
of elected or appointed offices generally. Minority cultural groups and those
positioned in devalued racial positions usually also lack effective political
voice. Many regard this political exclusion or marginalization of subordinate
groups and persons as wrong because it undermines promises of equal
opportunity and political equality implied by democratic commitments.
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Borrowing the language from the previous section, such perception of the
injustice of political inequality may be used to break the circle by which
formal and majority-rule-based political democracy tends to reproduce social
inequality. More inclusion of and influence for currently underrepresented
minority groups may help a society confront and find some remedies for
structural social inequality.
One important way to promote greater inclusion of members of under-
represented social groups is through political and associational institutions
designed specifically to increase the representation of women, working-class
people, racial or ethnic minorities, and so on. Proportional representation,
quotas in electoral lists, reserved seats, have all been proposed and many
implemented to promote group representation. Social movements increasingly
call for forms of group representation not only in legislatures, but also in
various kinds of commissions and boards, private corporate governing
bodies, and civic associations, as well as state institutions. Proposals for group
representation are almost always controversial. However, structural exclusions
that lead to such proposals do not disappear without solution at the level of
institutional design. At the same time, it should also be indicated that specific
representation of otherwise marginalized and underrepresented groups does
not follow immediately from commitment to political equality, and additional
normative arguments are required.
One of the most common critiques against specific representation of
women or of other minority groups is the suggestion that the physical or
membership attributes of people as such are grounds for their representing
those with similar attributes thus defined. However, advocates of the specific
representation of women or other minority groups argue that women or
others defined as a minority or marginalized group have similar experiences
that only others of the same group can understand with the same immediacy.
Yet, others worry that justifying group representation in terms of experiences,
interests or opinions allegedly shared by all members of the group obscures
differences within the group, wrongly reduces all members of the group to a
common essence, and thereby also divides groups so much from each other
that understanding and cooperation across the differences might become
impossible. 
Here, the theory of representation offered in the previous sections of this
paper may respond to some of these concerns about and oppositions to group
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representation. Group representation is not properly conceived as an attention
only to attributes people share, nor is it a making present of some set of
interests, opinions or experiences that all members o the group supposedly
share. The theory of representation offered in this paper rejects the
assumption that a person’s participation in large-scale politics may somehow
be individualized. 
All systems and institutions of representation group individuals according
to some kind of principles and criteria, and none are neutral in this regard.
Whether the principle of constituency is geography, organizational or
occupational interest, or social group interest or position, members of the
constituency are better represented when they organize together to discuss
their agreements and differences with each other and with the representatives.
In the first place, any constituency is internally differentiated and has to be
organized in relation to a representative. Furthermore, individuals are better
represented when representative bodies are plural, and when individuals
have plural relationships to representatives, in both political and civic
organizations. Distinctive modes of representation by interest, opinion and
perspective already describe such pluralization. Among these, the notion of
representing a perspective specifically aims to respond to objections to group
representation which claim that social groups cannot be defined by common
interests or opinions. To the extent that what distinguishes social groups is
structural relations, particularly structural relations of privilege and
disadvantage, and to the extent that persons are similarly positioned in those
structures, then they have similar perspectives both on their own situation
and on other positions in the society. 
Arguments for the special representation of structural social groups that
would otherwise be underrepresented, therefore, appeal to the contribution
such practices can and should make to inclusive political discussion and
engagement with those who are different and with whom there may be
conflicts. First, when there has been a history of exclusion or marginalization
of some groups from political influence such as policymaking and lawmaking,
members of those groups may be apathetic or positively refuse to try to
engage with others to solve shared problems. Under such circumstances, the
specific representation of underrepresented groups encourages participation
and engagement. Second, where some structural social groups have
dominated political discussion and decision-making, these social perspectives
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have usually defined political priorities and are often taken as universal.
Special representation of otherwise excluded social perspectives reveals the
partiality and specificity of the perspectives already politically present. 
The argument that the perspective of differentiated social groups should
all be represented in political decision-making does not specify who does or
should do the representing. The question that becomes relevant here in
general and particularly to the proportional representation system in South
Korea to be discussed in the following section is whether it is necessary that
the person who represents a social group perspective in a particular political
context be a member of that group. If representation consists in a relationship
between the constituency and the representative in which the constituency
contests within itself about the issues to be represented and calls the
representative to account, then a social group constituency certainly can and
should ask how well a person with the presumed descriptive attributes in fact
represents a social perspective. Further, it cannot be assumed that all those
positioned by structures in a similar way will express issues conditioned by
this situated perspective in the same unified way. Therefore, a system or
institution of group representation would and should do best to pluralize
group representation. Representation of the perspective of women, for
example, in a legislative body or commission would be better done by means
of a committee of women rather than just one woman. A committee can
contain some of the differences and variances in perspectives that cross the
group as well as the differences in individual experience and judgment that
can better enable the committee to analyze social situations from the gendered
perspective of women and express this perspective to a broader public.
To summarily reiterate the argument made in this paper so far, com-
mitment to political equality entails that democratic institutions and practices
take measures explicitly to include the representation of social groups whose
perspectives would likely be excluded from expression in discussion or
marginalized in political process without those measures. They are either a
numerical minority or they are socially or economically disadvantaged, or the
prevailing political discourse is dominated by other perspectives. Social
groups should be recognized and included in their specificity in deliberative
democratic processes. Then the question arising now is how such specific
group representation should be accomplished through which institutional
designs and arrangements. 
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There are many ways that democracies can apply the principle that
discussion and decision-making should take special measures to include
social groups whose perspectives would likely be excluded or marginalized
without those measures. Which is best depends on the political situation, the
nature of the structural distinction of the polity, possible trade-offs with other
political values, and the institutional context for representation. The goal of
bringing more members of underrepresented or marginalized groups into
representative bodies of polity decision-making may be applicable not only to
the national legislature but also to local legislatures, official political
committees and commissions, organs of political parties and so on. Further,
such goal can be achieved by many means, such as by designating seats, by
other electoral schemes, and so forth. 
Although there are no general formula for applying a principle of
inclusive representation, discussions in the following part concentrate on the
institutional efforts to increase group representation in legislatures and
lawmaking processes, as this is the context in which issues of group
representation are most contested and relevant. One means of group
representation is to reserve a specific number of seats or positions in a
representative body for representatives of a particular group. Reserving seats
for particular groups may tend to freeze both the identity of that group and its
relations with other groups in the polity, however, therefore some less rigid
procedure is desirable for adapting to changing social relations. Reserving
seats may also tend to freeze the specially represented group members out of
additional representational opportunities in other contested seats, thus
possibly isolating and marginalizing the specifically represented group at the
representational level. For these reasons, reserving seats in authoritative
decision-making bodies should be a last resort and temporary option for
representing otherwise excluded or marginalized perspectives.15)
On the other hand, quotas for women in party lists as analyzed in detail in
the following section of this paper, or, more generally, rules mandating a
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them.
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certain proportion of minority group members to be present in party list, are
often acceptable and desirable ways of promoting the inclusion of diverse
perspectives and interests, as this method does not disconnect group members
from others, but include them in wider party deliberations. Depending on the
number of parties and the voting procedures, voters from all groups continue
to have several candidate options. David Ryden argues that strengthening the
formation and active deliberation of political parties is the best way to foster
the representation of politically interested social groups with different
perspectives,16) to which point this paper returns in the later parts as it
discusses South Korea’s current proportional representation system. 
Political parties can be an important tool for applying principles of the
inclusive representation of diverse and pluralized social perspectives, as the
South Korean experience in more recent decades with its proportional
representation system indicates. However, especially larger and more
established parties with some political influence are likely to suffer the same
biases towards representing the interests and perspectives of more privileged
social segments that state institutions have, without affirmative measures in
party practices to attend to social group representation in decision-making
bodies and candidate lists. To promote the inclusion of the broadest possible
social perspectives in political communication and decision-making, then,
political parties should require special attention to groups and compensatory
measures for underrepresentation. 
Proportional representation that institutionally requires political parties
under the relevant election rule to attend to minority representation tends to
increase party competition and enable more parties to obtain legislative seats
than do simple winner-take-all systems. Systems of such proportional
representation also allow voters more opportunity to join with others in
various structural social groups. These arguments are persuasive as
grounding the claim that proportional representation provides more
opportunity for differentiated representation than does a system based on
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POLITICAL PARTIES 110-138 (1996). Ryden argues that special measures for social group
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and fragment politics, and it is better to use party politics as the vehicle for contesting and
constructing group representation.
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single-member, winner-take-all electoral districts.
III. Proportional Representation System and Minority
Representation at the Legislature in South Korea
1. Evolution of the Proportional Representation System in South Korea,
1963-Present
The current election system for National Assembly, i.e., the national
legislature, consists of (i) the single-member simple plurality electorate system
through which constituents elect one representative per electoral district for
245 out of its 299 seats,17) and (ii) the proportional representation system
through which the rest of 54 representatives are elected out of a single national
district from the list prepared by respective political parties in proportion to
the votes given to the parties.18) The voters are to exercise two separate votes,
(i) one for the individual candidate within applicable electoral district either
nominated by a political party or by a certain number of electoral district
residents, and (ii) the other for the political party whose name appears on the
ballot paper whose list of candidates for proportional representation seats are
presented to the voters in advance to the election date in a fixed order or
priority out of a single national district. For proportional representation, only
political parties may prepare and present the list of potential proportional
representatives.19)
The proportional representation system as applicable to National
Assembly was initially introduced in 1963 under the Constitution of the Third
Republic of Korea, and has been in place since the general election held in
1963 that constituted the 6th National Assembly (1963-1967). Prior to 2001, the
voters were given one vote and had to vote for one individual candidate from
the electoral district they belong, and the seats under the proportional
representation system were assigned to political parties in proportion to the
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17) DAEHANMINGUK HEONBEOP [CONSTITUTION OF KOREA], art. 41(2); GONGJIKSEONGEOBEOP [PUBLIC
OFFICIAL ELECTION ACT], art. 20(1).
18) GONGJIKSEONGEOBEOP [PUBLIC OFFICIAL ELECTION ACT], art. 21(1).
19) Id., art. 47(1) and 48(1).
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number of votes each party earned in the above electoral district election. This
“one vote per voter for both electoral district representative and proportional
representative” system was held unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court
of the Republic of Korea in 2001,20) and the current “one voter two votes”
system, under which each voter votes separately (i) for the individual
candidate running for the electoral district representation and (ii) for the
political party for the proportional representation, was introduced for the first
time at the general election in 2004 that constituted the 17th National Assembly
(2004-2008). For presidential election, South Korea has a relative plurality or
simple plurality system. At the local council level, at elections to constitute
local legislatures, the “one voter two votes” system also applies, under which
the representatives are partly elected by earning the most number of votes
from the electoral district21) and partly elected through the party list.
South Korea’s proportional representation system was introduced in order
to better address minority perspectives in political process and to increase
expertise of the representative body,22) which are known shortcomings of
simple plurality electoral district system that has long been the basic design of
South Korea’s election system. Under a simple plurality electoral district
system through which one who earns simply the most number of votes is
elected per electoral district, it is generally easier for larger and more
established political parties with more resources to secure seats at the
legislature, causing many of dead votes,23) thereby reducing the opportunity
for varied perspectives including those of minorities to be present and
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20) Decision of July 19, 2001, 2000Hun-ma91 (Consitutional Court of Korea) on PUBLIC
OFFICIAL ELECTION ACT, art. 146(2).
21) There are two levels of local government in South Korea. JIBANGJACHIBEOP [LOCAL
AUTONOMY ACT] art. 2. Among these, at metropolitan units of provinces and metro-cities, one
representative is elected from each of the electoral districts; at the smaller units of Si/Gun/Gu,
two representatives are elected from each of the electoral districts.
22) Myungsoon Shin, A Critical Analysis of the National District Electoral System in Korea, 28(2)
KOREAN POL. SCI. ASS’N. J 239 (1994); SOON-CHUL AHN, A COMPARISON OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS:
INSTITUTIONAL IMPACT AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE (2000); Ah Ran Hwang, Introduction of One Person
Two Votes System in the 17th General Election, 12(2) NAT’L STRATEGIES 61 (2006); Ah Ran Hwang,
Suggestions for the National Assembly Electoral District Reform, in Young Jae Jin (ed.), ELECTION IN
KOREA (IV) (2002).
23) On this point, see REIN TAAGEPERA & MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART, SEATS & VOTES: THE
EFFECTS AND DETERMINANTS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (1989).
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represented at the legislature.24)
Proportional representative system, on the other hand, lowers by its
design the entry barrier to the legislature for minorities, thereby widening the
forum for public discussion and deliberation of minority interests, opinions
and perspectives through official political processes of decision-making and,
therefore, in the public domain of the polity. Also, proportional representation
system is to contribute to heightened expertise of the legislature overall, as
individuals from wide spectrum including experts in various fields may enter
National Assembly or local council with no burden of managing the electoral
district or campaigning, with few exceptions.
The proportional representation system was initially introduced to South
Korea through its constitutional revision in 1962 (the 5th constitutional
revision), and has been implemented since the general election in 1963 that
constituted the 6th National Assembly (1963-1967). During the years
immediately following its introduction, the proportional representation
system in South Korea was operated for the purpose of increasing dominance
of the ruling party over National Assembly, by providing certain institutional
premium to the political party that obtained the most number of electoral
district seats by intended design. Prior to the introduction of the “one person
two votes” system in the 2004 general election that constitute the 17th National
Assembly (2004-2008), the proportional representation system in South Korea
under “one vote for both electoral district representatives and for national
district proportional representatives” system, as South Korean political
scientists have unequivocally analyzed, functioned to fortify dominance of the
ruling party over National Assembly,25) to enlarge influence of the party
leadership upon assemblypersons of the same party membership,26) and to
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24) M. Kenneth McElwain, Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party
Dominance, 52(1) AM. J. POL. SCI 32 (2008); DAVID M. FARRELL, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE
INTRODUCTION (2001).
25) Meen-Geon Kim & Ji-Yeon Shim, Strategic Intentions in Changes in Electoral System in
Korea, 36(1) KOREAN POL. SCI. ASS’N. J. 139 (2002); Wan-Ki Ahn, Relationship Between Electoral
System And Political Party Structure in Korea, 7 KOREA NORTH EAST ASS’N. J. 23 (1998); Young-Kook
Chung & Myungsoon Shin, National District Proportional Representation System and National
Assembly, KOREAN LEGISLATIVE STUDIES INSTITUTE 1992-1993 RESEARCH PROJECT PAPER (1994); Yong-
Ho Kim, Changes in General Election And Their Political Effects, in Nam-Young Lee, ELECTION IN
KOREA (1993).
26) HYUNG-SUP YOON, POLITICS IN KOREA (1992).
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relieve the party’s financial burden.27) The institutional purpose of proportional
representation system was defeated further, as the voters were not provided
with the opportunity to distinguish between their preferences for individual
candidates and those for the political parties under the previous “one vote for
both” system, although the electoral district representatives and the
proportional representatives were chosen through separate mechanisms.28)
Under the previous or the “Third Republic” proportional representation
system, although the proportional representation system was in place, such
seats were assigned to the political parties in proportion to the number of
votes that respective parties gained at the electoral district election. The
political party that received the most number of votes at the electoral district
election was given proportional representation seats of maximum of 2/3 of all
proportional representation seats, if it obtained of or over 50% of all votes; if
the votes were short of 50% of all votes, then the party was given 1/2 of all
proportional representation seats. As the political situation at that time
operated in favor of the ruling party, such proportional representation system
skewed in favor of the ruling party functioned to further strengthen ruling
party’s dominance over the national legislature.
What followed through the constitutional revision in 1972 (the 7th
constitutional revision) was a change in the proportional representation
system to further increase the dominance over National Assembly of the
ruling party and the nation’s President. Beginning at the 1973 general election
that constituted the 9th National Assembly (1973-1978), 146 assemblypersons
out of its full membership of 219 were elected from the electoral district
through direct votes of the voters; however, the rest of 73 members of
National Assembly were chosen not by the direct vote but by the electoral
college of “People’s Council for Unification and Autonomy,” consisting of
approximately 2,500 members. The People’s Council was an institution
established by the Constitution that elected proportional representatives for
National Assembly as such, as well as the nation’s President. President, in
turn, served ex officio as the chair of the Council. Under this design, the ruling
party could safely control the national legislature. Subsequently, the
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constitutional revision in 1980 (the 8th constitutional revision) reshaped the
proportional representation system so that it returned to the original
proportional representation model under the Third Republic (1962-1972). Out
of 276 seats at National Assembly, 92 seats, equivalent to 1/3 of the entire
membership, were designated to proportional representatives. These
proportional representation seats were assigned to political parties in
accordance with the ratio of votes respective parties received at the electoral
district election cast for the individual candidates. The political party that
secured the most number of seats through electoral district election gained
2/3 of the proportional representation seats, and the rest of the parties that
secured 5 or more seats at National Assembly through electoral district
election were assigned according to the ratio the rest of the proportional
representation seats. 
Under the current Constitution of the Sixth Republic of Korea (1988-
present), the proportional representation system has gradually yet
significantly evolved. At the 1988 general election that constituted the 13th
National Assembly (1988-1992), the proportional representation seats were
assigned to the parties according to the result of the electoral district election
as in the previous election. The political party that gained the most number of
electoral district seats obtained 1/2 of the proportional representation seats for
the claimed purpose of stability of national politics, thereby securing a higher
ratio of seats at National Assembly than the actual ratio among valid votes
earned at the electoral district election.29) At the general elections in 1992, 1996
and 2000, which constituted the 14th (1992-1996), 15th (1996-2000) and 16th
(2000-2004) National Assembly respectively, there were changes in the
number of proportional representation seats and the minimum requirement
for distributing proportional representation seats in terms of the number of
seats earned through electoral district election, and so forth, and the party that
gained the most number of seats at electoral district election could no longer
take 1/2 of the proportional representation seats. However, it remained
unchanged that the proportional representation seats were assigned out to
political parties according to the result of the electoral district election under
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“one vote for both electoral district representatives and proportional
representatives” system.30)
In July 2001, a decision of the Constitutional Court brought in a
breakthrough in South Korea’s proportional representation system.31) In this
decision, the Constitution Court held that the mechanism of distributing
proportional representation seats in accordance with the result of the electoral
district election under “one vote for both” system was unconstitutional. The
Constitutional Court based its decision on the ground that the assumption of
the then-current election law fictitiously identifying the voters’ preferences for
individual candidates in electoral district as those for the political parties at
national district for proportional representation seats violates the principles of
democracy, direct vote and equal vote, thereby infringing the fundamental
right to vote held by individual voters. Subsequently, the relevant statutes
were revised in compliance of this Constitutional Court decision, introducing
the “one person two votes” system to the general election and to the local
council election in South Korea.32) The mechanism of distributing the
proportional representation seats also changed accordingly.
Under the current system, the entire membership of National Assembly
consists of 299 seats.33) Among these, 245 seats are for the representatives
elected through electoral district election by simple plurality under one person
per district rule; the other 54 seats are for the proportional representatives
chosen from the party list in the order fixed and disclosed prior to the election,
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30) Through revisions in election law in 1991, the proportional representation seats were
assigned to respective political parties in proportion to the number of seats each party earned
through electoral district election, with no premium of set proportion for the party that secured
the most number of seats at electoral district election. Through a subsequent revision of the
Public Official Election Act in 1994 (Law Number 4739, effective March 16, 1994), the
proportional representation seats at National Assembly began to be assigned to political parties
in proportion to the ratio of votes each party received against all valid votes cast at the electoral
district election.
31) Decision of July 19, 2001, 2000Hun-ma91 (Constitutional Court of Korea) on PUBLIC
OFFICIAL ELECTION ACT, art. 146(2).
32) See, e.g., PUBLIC OFFICIAL ELECTION ACT, art. 189 and 190-2. This system has been
consistently and affirmatively acknowledged by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Korea in
relevant cases as well. See, e.g., Decision of June 11, 2009, 2008Do11042 (Supreme Court of
Korea).
33) CONSTITUTION OF KOREA, art. 41(2);  PUBLIC OFFICIAL ELECTION ACT, art. 21(1).
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now through the separate vote for the political parties.34) In order to obtain
proportional representation seat, a political party should either gain five seats
at National Assembly through electoral district election, or earn 3% or more of
valid votes cast to political parties.35) To the political parties that satisfy such
minimum requirement, proportional representation seats are assigned in
proportion to the ratio of votes each of such political parties has earned at the
vote given to the parties.36) This mechanism intends to lower the entry barrier
to the national and the local legislatures for minority or smaller political
parties. Furthermore, the statute requires that any political party place women
to all odd-numbered queues in preparing the list of individuals for
proportional representation seats,37) thereby mandating one-half or more of
the proportional representation seats to be filled by women.38)
At the level of local council or local legislature, South Korea also has the
proportional representation system. At the local level, the number of seats
under proportional representation system is 10/100 of the entire number of
seats at respective council.39) Here, those political parties that have gained
5/100 or more of the valid votes given to the parties take proportional
representation seats in accordance with the ratio of valid votes respective
parties earned, while at the same time no single political party may take more
than 2/3 of the proportional representation seats.40) At the local council level,
political parties should nominate female candidates at all odd-numbered
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34) PUBLIC OFFICIAL ELECTION ACT, arts. 21(1) and 25(2).
35) Id., art. 189(1).
36) Id.T, art. 189(1).
37) Id., art. 47(3).
38) This requirement applies to the nomination of candidates for proportional
representatives at the local council as well (PUBLIC OFFICIAL ELECTION ACT, art. 47(3)). Should a
political party be in violation of this requirement, such party may not register any of the
candidates it endorses and nominates (PUBLIC OFFICIAL ELECTION ACT, art. 49(8)), or the
registration, if completed, is rescinded (PUBLIC OFFICIAL ELECTION ACT, art. 52(1)). However, to the
proportional representation system at general election to constitute National Assembly, these
penalty provisions do not currently apply, which calls for a revision to this effect applicable to
general election. As a relevant matter, under Public Official Election Act Article 47(4), a political
party should make its best effort to nominate women for 30% or more of its candidates for
electoral district seats at National Assembly and local council, in which case the party is entitled
to additional subsidy for election purposes.
39) PUBLIC OFFICIAL ELECTION ACT, arts. 22 and 190-2(1).
40) Id., art. 190-2(2).
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queues in their list for proportional representation seats.41)
The following two tables indicate the number of female representatives
throughout South Korea’s parliamentary history both at the national and local
levels, under different designs of its proportional representation system.
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41) Id., arts. 47(3), 49(8) and 52(1). See supra notes 37 and 38.
Table 1. Number of National Assemblywomen in South Korea, 1948-Present
National Number of Number of Number of Number of 
Assembly Representatives Female Assemblywomen Female Proportional 
(Election Year) at National Assemblypersons Elected from Districts Representatives
Assembly (Percentage) (Percentage among (Percentage among
Elected Representatives) Proportional 
Representatives)
1st (1948) 200 1 (0.5%) 1/200 (0.5%) -
2nd (1950) 210 2 (0.9%) 2/210 (0.9%) -
3rd (1954) 203 1 (0.5%) 1/203 (0.5%) -
4th (1958) 233 3 (1.3%) 3/233 (1.3%) -
5th (1960) 233 1 (0.4%) 1/233 (0.4%) -
6th (1963) 175 2 (1.1%) 1/131 (0.7%) 1/44 (2.3%)
7th (1967) 175 3 (1.7%) 1/131 (0.7%) 2/44 (4.5%)
8th (1971) 204 5 (2.5%) 0/153 (0.0%) 5/51 (9.8%)
9th (1973) 219 12 (5.5%) 2/146 (1.4%) 10/73 (13.7%)
10th (1978) 231 8 (3.5%) 1/154 (0.6%) 7/77 (9.1%)
11th (1981) 276 9 (3.3%) 1/184 (0.5%) 8/92 (8.7%)
12th (1985) 276 8 (2.9%) 2/184 (1.1%) 6/92 (6.5%)
13th (1988) 299 6 (2.0%) 0/224 (0.0%) 6/75 (8.0%)
14th (1992) 299 8 (2.7%) 1/237 (0.4%) 7/62 (11.3%)
15th (1996) 299 11 (3.7%) 3/253 (1.2%) 8/46 (17.4%)
16th (2000) 273 16 (5.9%) 5/227 (2.2%) 11/46 (23.9%)
17th (2004) 299 39 (13%) 10/243 (4.1%) 29/56 (51.8%)
18th (2008) 299 41 (13.7%) 14/245 (5.7%) 27/54 (50.0%)
Total 4,403 176 49 127
Numbers
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2. South Korea’s Proportional Representation System from the Perspective
of Representation of Minority and Marginalized Groups in a Pluralized
Society
1) South Korea’s Proportional Representation System and the Representation of
Minority Perspectives in the Legislature
One of the important intended purposes of the proportional representation
system is to serve as a vehicle that conveys to the legislature the interests,
opinions and perspectives held by diverse individuals and groups including
minorities. For any meaningful discussion for institutional improvement of
proportional representation system in South Korea, a diagnosis should
precede with respect to whether it contributes to enhance the presence and the
representation of minorities or their interests, opinions and perspectives, at
South Korea’s policymaking and lawmaking institutions and processes, while
South Korean society is growingly diversified and pluralized. 
Preceding studies on this aspect of South Korea’s proportional
representation system have been made mainly in the eyes of political science
since early 1990s. They include those works analyzing the social and economic
backgrounds of proportional representatives as opposed to those of electoral
district representatives,43) the pattern of assignment of proportional
representatives to standing committees within National Assembly as opposed
to that of electoral district representatives,44) the political relations and
dynamics between potential proportional representatives and the party
leadership through the preparation process for the party list,45) the legislative
activities of proportional representatives as opposed to those of electoral
district representatives,46) and, more generally, the overall influence resulting
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42) Ehwa Yoon, Analysis of the Gender Quota for Proportional Representation System in Korea,
11(2) KOREAN AUTONOMOUS LOCAL GOV. SOC’Y J. 69, 80 (2009).
43) Young-Kook Chung, Analysis of Standing Committee Activities of the Proportional
Representatives in National Assembly, 11(1) KOREA AND WORLD POL. 53 (1995); Shin, supra note 22;
YOON, supra note 26.
44) Chung, supra note 43.
45) Shin, supra note 22; YOON, supra note 26.
46) Sang-Joon Ka, Byung-Kwon Son, Jong-Bin Yoon & Jun-Young Choi, A Comparison Of
Characteristics And Outcome of Legislative Activities Between Electoral District Representatives And 
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from the implementation of the proportional representation system in South
Korea.47) A both comprehensive and in-depth analysis over all such important
aspects pertaining to South Korea’s proportional representation system from
constitutional law perspective is now due.
One of the recent research efforts to the point intended to see whether the
ideological positions, propensities or inclinations of proportional representatives
did indeed differ from those of electoral district representatives to the extent
that such difference is statistically meaningful.48) The basic premises of this
research project are as follows: first, the dispersion of ideological positions of
proportional representatives spread over wider spectrum than that of electoral
district representatives; and, second, the ideological positions, beliefs and
value structures of proportional representatives differ from those held by
electoral district representatives.49) Pursuant to this research, up until the 16th
National Assembly (2000-2004), no statistically meaningful distinction is
found between proportional representatives and electoral district representa-
tives in light of the purpose of representing various perspectives including
those of minorities at the legislature. 
Yet, this research indicates that, at the 17th National Assembly (2004-2008)
constituted through the 2004 general election following the introduction of
“one person two votes” system and the “gender quota on party list” rule for
proportional representation system, a considerable disparity existed between
proportional representatives and electoral district representatives, particularly
in the case of assemblypersons with Democratic Party (“Min-Joo” Party) and
Uri Party50) memberships.51) Finally, this research shows that, at the current
332 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 9: 301
Proportional Representatives in National Assembly, KOREAN LEGISLATIVE STUDIES INSTITUTE RESEARCH
PAPER (2007); Eun-Hee Song, The Past And Present Of The National Assembly And Women In Korea:
On Women’s Sharing Of The Assembly Seats, 30(3) KOREAN POL. SCI. ASS’N J. 61 (1996).
47) Shin, supra note 22; Kim, supra note 25.
48) Sang-Joon Ka, A Comparative Study of Ideological Differences between Proportional
Representatives and District Representatives, 14(1) LEGISLATIVE STUDIES 109 (2009). In this research,
the author analyzes the legislative activities at the 17th (2004-2008) and 18th (2008-2012) National
Assembly in comparison with the 16th National Assembly (2000-2004), to see the outcome of the
“one person two votes” system and the gender quota as intended, by way of in-depth written
interviews with assemblypersons over several times.
49) Id.
50) Uri Party was established in 2003 and was voluntarily dissolved in 2007.
51) Ka, supra note 48.
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18th National Assembly (2008-2012), while a constitutionally meaningful
difference in ideological dispersion between the proportional representatives
as a whole and the electoral district representatives as a whole still exists, such
difference disappears within a political party. Rather, the research proceeds to
indicate that the ideological stance of practically all proportional representatives
across different political parties is more homogenized now than the past.52)
These together mandate certain institutional modifications and changes of
South Korea’s proportional representation system for the system’s intended
normative goal of having minority perspectives present and represented in its
legislature and political process in general.
2) Gender Quota applicable to South Korea’s Proportional Representation
System in Light of Representation of Minority Perspectives under
Representative-Deliberative Democracy
Another distinctive aspect of South Korea’s current proportional
representation system is that the law requires the political parties nominate
female candidates to all odd-numbered queues in their list for proportional
representation seats both at national and local legislative levels.53) This is to
guarantee that 50% or more of all proportional representation seats to be
occupied by female representatives.
At National Assembly, in the inaugural National Assembly through the 5th
Assembly over the period of 1948 to 1963, only a few women took the seats at
National Assembly. They were elites rather than those representing the cross-
section of the female constituency, who mostly had previously been involved
in the political and social movement for, for example, independence from
Japanese colonial rule. The ratio of female representatives across National
Assembly during this period was approximately 1%. It is worth noting here
that voting rights for women were obtained in South Korea simultaneously
with those for men, without much of relevant public debates or political
struggle, as the voting rights for both women and men were included in the
inaugural 1948 Constitution upon establishment of the First Republic of
Korea. Therefore, at least from institutional standpoint, women were able to
Representation of Minority under Deliberative Democracy~   |  333No. 2: 2010
52) Id., at 122-125.
53) PUBLIC OFFICIAL ELECTION ACT, art. 47(3).
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participate in the political process on par with their male counterpart.
However, in actual reality across the community life, patriarchal modes of
thinking and living remained largely unchanged, resulting in hardly any
participation, activities or election of women in or through public elections.54)
Following this initial period, in the 6th National Assembly through the 10th
National Assembly over the period of 1963 to 1981, the authoritarian regimes
proactively induced participation of women in politics as part of the effort to
compensate their lack of democratic legitimacy in obtaining and maintaining
the political power. Major changes were made to the electoral system,
including the introduction of the proportional representation system
operating concurrently with the single member simple plurality electorate
system. During this period, there was a notable increase in the number of
assemblywomen. However, such a change was brought in primarily to fortify
dominance of the ruling party and the incumbent government over National
Assembly.55)
Next, in the 11th National Assembly through the 14th National Assembly
over the period of 1981 to 1996, the law and the system for increased female
participation in politics for its symbolic and actual impact began to be
seriously discussed in the public and official domains of the community.
Gender issues and Gendered issues became part of official policy agenda in
the public sector and women entered the positions of policymaking, thus
enlarging the opportunities for women to participate in policymaking
processes. Participation and presence of women in politics grew both
quantitatively and qualitatively. From this period on, each political party
conspicuously began to make election promises relevant and applicable to
women. This indicates that the political parties began to perceive votes of
female voters as an independent variable or element for determining the
outcome of any given election, which in itself has a significant meaning in
South Korean constitutional-political history.
In the 15th National Assembly through the 17th National Assembly over
the period of 1996 to 2008, the status of female representatives as legislative
334 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 9: 301
54) Jin-Sun Ryu, Participation of Women in National Assembly General Election in Korea
(2006) (PH. D dissertation, Chosun University).
55) Id.
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experts was palpably established. Simultaneously, with the rule of authoritarian
government coming to an end, the perception of and the concern for minorities
rose in general in South Korean society in the context of liberalization,
democratization and pluralization. Against this background, the South
Korean politics showed mounted interests and understanding in and of
women and the issues pertaining to women.56) This enabled the issue of
participation in politics and policymaking on the part of women to be
centrally situated as one of the main objects of public debate and discussion.
On the part of law and legal system, a female quota system applicable to
the party list for proportional representation seats was introduced and
implemented through revisions of the Public Official Election Act and the
Political Party Act. At its initial step, the law required the political party to
nominate 30% or more of female candidates in preparing its list for
proportional representation seats. The first general election following the
introduction of such gender quota system was the 2000 general election that
constituted the 16th National Assembly (2000-2004). Since the 2000 general
election, the number of female representatives at National Assembly has
sharply increased. With the changes in election law encouraging the parties to
nominate women to 30% or more of candidates at electoral district election
and mandating the parties to nominate women to 50% of candidates for
proportional representation seats,57) this trend is ongoing. Through the 2004
general election that constituted the 17th National Assembly (2004-2008) and
the most recently held 2008 general election that constituted the currently
sitting 18th National Assembly (2008-2012), the number of female
representatives at National Assembly has constantly grown. In terms of
legislative and other parliamentary activities, the National Assemblywomen
in recent years have proactively been exercising their expertise in various
standing committees and beyond.
At local council or local legislatures, the ratio of female representatives is
still extremely low,58) although the conventional competition among men has
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56) Also, during this period, policy institutions and research centers dedicated for
specifically addressing and discussing gender and women issues such as the Korean Institute
for Women and Politics, which was established in 1989, were formed and began to function,
thereby proactively engaging the constituents across the polity in such issues.
57) PUBLIC OFFICIAL ELECTION ACT, arts. 47(3) and 47(4).
58) See Table 2 inserted in the text.
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been relatively low and mitigated compared with that at the level of national
politics, in the process of constituting and operating local council.59) The ratio
of women representatives at local council almost doubled from the initial local
council election under the current Constitution in 1991 by the time of the 1995
local election, as each of the political parties, facing the direct election for the
chief executive of the local government, adopted the strategy of nominating
relatively many of female candidates at local council election in order to
appeal to the female population.60) Experience at local election cumulatively
shows that such proportional representation system as institutionally
mandating at least 50% of the seats for women by designating the positioning
on party list, as well as the electoral district election that elects two or more
representatives than one from each electoral district has been more productive
in increasing the female presence at the local council.61) Also, under the same
legal system, more women were elected to local council in larger cities than in
rural areas, indicating perception pertaining to women’s presence and
participation in political process and public sphere still varies significantly due
to the socio-economic and cultural backgrounds in the 1990s and beyond.62)
Facing the 2000 general election, the Political Party Act was revised to a
30% quota for the party list for proportional representation seats at the local
council. Now, through revisions in the Public Official Election Act and the
Political Party Act in 2002 that aimed for the local election then upcoming in
the same year, political parties are encouraged to nominate 30% or more of
women candidates at the local electoral district election for the metropolitan
local government units, and are required to nominate 50% or more of women
336 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 9: 301
59) In South Korea, local autonomy system was restored in as late as 1991, after all local
councils under the previous local autonomy system were dissolved immediately following the
military coup d’état in May 1961; and the governors, mayors and other local government heads
began to be elected through the residents’ direct election in 1995. A detailed analysis of the
current situation of female representation at the local council is found, for example, in Chae-Bok
Park, Solution for Political Parties to Increase Female Representation at Local Elections, 18 WORLD
REGIONAL STUDIES J. 37 (2002).
60) At the 1995 election, approximately 10% of the nominated candidates in the party list for
proportional representation seats for local council were women across all political parties that
participated in the election.
61) Yoon, supra note 42. 
62) Han-Soo Choi, An Analysis of the Outcome of 1998 Local Elections, 47 KOREAN AUTONOMOUS
LOCAL GOV. SOC’Y J. 25 (1998).
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candidates for proportional representation seats at all local council under the
local autonomy system. However, the result of the 2006 local election indicates
that, while the number of female candidates almost doubled from the 2002
local election, the number of elected female representatives did not increase
much from the 2002 local election.63)
A closer look at the outcome of the recent local elections shows that, while
the same law pertaining to the proportional representation system is
applicable to both metropolitan local government units and smaller Si/Gun/
Gu local government units, more women representatives enter the Si/Gun/
Gu local council. This is at least partly due to the mandate of positioning
women candidates at all odd-numbered queues on the party list for pro-
portional representation seats, as the number of seats at local council at
Si/Gun/Gu local government units is smaller than the number of seats at
local council at metropolitan local government units.64) The number of women
representatives across the local council in South Korea has gradually
increased. However, the ratio of female representatives at local council
reached 10% for the first time at the most recent local election in 2006. Apart
from the proportional representatives, the ratio of female representatives
elected to the local council through electoral district election is still less than
5%. This reality calls for a further effort to enhance the representation and
participation of female population in the political process and the overall
politics in South Korea at the level of institutional design.
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63) Many of new systems and incentives were introduced in the 2006 local elections such as
remuneration for local council members, medium-sized local electoral district, party nomination
of the candidates, proportional representation system at non-metropolitan Si/Gun/Gu local
government units, which makes it difficult to single out and analyze the effect of gender quota
for the party list for proportional representation as an independent variable since 2006.
However, there is no doubt that the intended purpose of the gender quota for the party list for
proportional representation at the local council level is to institutionalize the long-standing
demand for increased presence and representation of women in the political process and to
secure support for the political parties involved. Ah Ran Hwang, The Impact of Political Parties on
Women’s Representation in Local Councils: An Analysis of the 2006 Local Election in Korea, 20(3)
LOCAL ADMIN. J. 51 (2006).
64) A more detailed analysis to this effect is found in Jae-Hun Chung, Analysis of the
Impact of Local Election Law: A Case Study of the 2006 Local Election (2007) (LL. M
dissertation, Mokwon University).
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IV. Concluding Remarks: Some Suggestions for South
Korea’s Proportional Representation System in Light of
Broader Constitutional Ramifications of Minority
Representation in Legislative Body and Political Process
under Representative-Deliberative Democracy
There have been 135 women altogether at South Korea’s National
Assembly, from the inaugural 1948 National Assembly to the 17th National
Assembly constituted in 2004. A research over 131 nations in the world
indicates that, as of 2008, the ratio on average of female representatives at the
national legislature in respective nations is approximately 11%.65) In South
Korea, the ratio of female representatives at the 17th National Assembly (2004-
2008) and the 18th National Assembly (2008-2012) is approximately 13%.
However, the ratio through the 16th National Assembly in the prior constitu-
tional history is, on average, 2.8%, with most of the female representatives
during this period were proportional representatives and only 35 women who
were elected to National Assembly through direct vote of the voters at
electoral district election. At the current 18th National Assembly (2008-2012),
the ratio of female representatives among the electoral district representatives
is just over 5%. 
Under such statistics, it may not be gainsaid that the proportional
representation system in South Korea has, as a system, contributed to enhance
the presence and the representation of women at the nation’s legislative body.
The next and more constitutionally challenging task is how to improve the
system, both at the institutional and real-life levels, so that the system itself
and the system-induced increase in presence and representation of women at
the legislature may bring in sustainable changes in perception and motive of
the entire constituents towards minority perspective representation and
participation in political process including that of women. This should lead to
further increased participation and representation in the policymaking and
lawmaking institutions and processes of the constituents including minorities
based on the inclusive expression and exchange of interests, opinions and
338 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 9: 301
65) Yoon, supra note 42, at 69, 90.
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perspectives. A comprehensive effort to study and improve the relevant law,
institutions and systems should continue. The following includes some of the
thoughts on South Korea’s proportional representation system as it currently
exists, in light of the representation of minority perspectives.
Under the relevant provisions of South Korea’s Constitution and statutes,
a functional proportional representation system may be an effective addition
to the current “one person two votes” system that combines the electoral
district election and the proportional representation of nationwide district
from political parties’ lists, both symbolically and practically.66) In this vein, an
increase in the number of proportional representation seats at the legislature
may serve to more effectively achieve the purpose, as intended in various
occasions both within and outside National Assembly and local legislatures.67)
The current proportional representation system, as indicated in the
previous part, counts upon political party’s nomination of potential represen-
tatives for obtaining the goal of the enlarged presence and representation of
various perspectives across South Korean society, including those of minorities.
Certain perspectives and groups such as NGOs engaged in environmental
protection or consumer rights protection did actually march into National
Assembly, thereby entering the forum for public discussion and debates and
are actively participating as new voices in policymaking and lawmaking
processes currently, due to the proportional representation system. However,
the current design of proportional representation system heightens an
opportunity for the ruling party to become the party with the most number of
seats at National Assembly and at local council, due to the fact that the
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66) NAK-IN SUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 178-179 (10TH ed. 2010). Nak-in Sung observes that it
is rare that a state with approximately the same population and of approximately the same size
as South Korea has a national constituency system for proportional representation. Id. at 177.
67) This effort has been made more actively since 2003, facing the then-upcoming 2004
general election to constitute the 17th National Assembly (2004-2008). The advisory committee
within National Assembly, the Pan-National Committee on Political Reform, officially advised
National Assembly to increase the number of proportional representation seats to 100 and
reduce the number of electoral district representatives to 199, on December 8, 2003. An effort to
revise the relevant statutes including the Public Official Election Act to this effect followed both
at the 16th National Assembly (2000-2004) and at the 17th National Assembly (2004-2008), though
such bills were discarded due to the expiration of terms. Such legislative efforts can be traced at
South Korean National Assembly’s URL at www.assembly.go.kr.
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proportional representatives may only come from the party list. This, as
combined with the relevant law and system pertaining to the formation and
activities of the political party-based negotiation groups within the
legislature,68) might hinder the minority members from assuming the role of
expressing and representing the interests, opinions and perspectives in the
appropriate political processes. This also might serve as an institutional barrier
against peaceful transition of regimes between the ruling party and the
opposition party.
As such, for South Korea’s current proportional representation system
exclusively designates the list prepared by each of the political parties as the
gate to the legislature, a self-directed and voluntary effort on the part of
respective political parties to search for, listen to, and engage themselves in the
voices, perspectives and demands from across the polity is the key to the
outcome intended by South Korea’s proportional representation system for
more and better representation of minorities including women. South Korea’s
current proportional representation system may serve to obtain the intended
purpose, only on the premise of democratization of and within political
parties.
Despite relatively short history of political party system under the
Constitution and frequent changes, splits and mergers of and among fractions
of political interest groups within and across various political parties, the
phenomenon of “political party state” is readily observed in South Korea, as
witnessed at recent electoral district elections where voters growingly tend to
vote for candidates endorsed by the political party they support than for those
not nominated by political parties. Under the current proportional
representation system, the voters cast a separate vote outright for the political
party they support, and the democratization of political parties is even more
crucial therefor. The political parties should initiate an effort to establish and
present standards and rules for party nomination of individuals for propor-
tional representation seats, and should apply such standards and rules
340 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 9: 301
68) On this point, it should be noted that legislative efforts have been made to reduce the
minimum number of seats at National Assembly required to form a negotiation group. The
current law sets the requirement at 20 or more members (National Assembly Act, Article 33).
For an example of such effort, albeit aborted, see Bill Number 174043 introduced to the 17th
National Assembly in March of 2006 that intended to reduce the number to 5.
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transparently.
Also, under the current election system, a concurrent nomination for
electoral district election and proportional representation may be a desirable
alternative for the purpose of securing qualified candidates who are also
expected to exercise the responsibilities as representatives sincerely on the
party platform and policies. However, this alternative should be given a
further thought as it might exacerbate bureaucratization of party leadership
and caucus69) in the political parties in South Korea. In addition, laws applicable
to discarding or changing political party membership by proportional
representatives subsequent to securing the position as such should be
prepared to cope with potentially significant outcome in light of the purpose
of the system.
South Korea has a unicameral legislature both at the national and the local
government levels, while power and authority in overall legislative and
parliamentary affairs is highly concentrated on the standing committees
within the legislature. This seriously undermines the deliberative function of
the legislature under South Korean Constitution’s indirect, representative and
deliberative democracy. Efforts to better represent interests, opinions and
perspectives of minorities in the representative body and the overall political
process are crucial for the legitimacy of South Korea’s representative and
deliberative democracy itself. 
Certain institutional efforts in this direction are ongoing, such as lowering
the number of representatives consenting to the introduction to a bill required
for the submission of a bill to National Assembly, mandating public hearing
during the standing committee process as part of legislative process for the
purpose of inviting various perspectives including minority’s on the subject
matter at low cost, supplementing rules and procedures relevant to legislative
petition. At the local council level, minority groups may now petition the chief
executive of the local government unit by securing a certain number of
signatures of fellow residents, mandating the chief executive to submit the
petition as a bill to the local council in its regular ordinance-making process.70)
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69) Professor Nak-in Sung has raised the same concern in this regard. See Sung, supra note
66, at 178-179.
70) LOCAL AUTONOMY ACT, art. 15.
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Ultimately, throughout public election, policymaking and lawmaking process
and particularly at the earliest point thereof, inclusive communication that
may solicit and sustain participation of constituents including minorities
should operate proactively. Guaranty of the freedom of expression and the
active and responsible media may also contribute in this direction.
Legislatures are not the only governmental bodies, in which arguments for
group representation can and should be applied. Appointed committees and
commissions are also among the other deliberative and decisionmaking
bodies that should be candidates for inclusive representation, even when
constituents do not directly vote on their composition. In recent years, more
attention has been devoted to the representation of diverse groups in bodies
and procedures such as these in South Korea. A more democratic represen-
tative government would have various layers and sites of elected, appointed
and volunteer bodies that discuss options for policies and laws, make policy
decisions and laws, or review the effectiveness of policies and laws.
In such bodies it is possible and desirable to give specific representation to
particular social group perspectives which might not otherwise be present.
Furthermore, the processes of authorization and accountability that constitute
the representative function should not be confined to official government
bodies. Civil society is also an important forum for the expression and
consolidation of social perspectives. Organization and activation in the public
spheres of civil society are among the best methods of maintaining con-
nections between representatives and constituents, and of insisting that
representatives be accountable. Autonomous and plural activities of civic
associations offer individuals and social groups maximum opportunity in
their own diversity to be represented in public life, thereby deepening
democracy.
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